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NOTE
INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS FOR INFLATION:
THE IMPACTS OF RECENT INFLATION TRENDS,
MUTUAL FUND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION,
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
A recurring tax reform proposal offers to index capital
gains for inflation. Indeed, as recently as the 105th Congress,
Senators Wayne Allard (R-Colo.) and Trent Lott (R-Mich.)
jointly sponsored a bill ("bill") "[tlo amend the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986 to reduce the maximum capital gains rates,
to index capital assets for inflation, and to repeal the Federal
estate and gift taxes ...... Section Two of the bill proposes to
index capital gains for inflation.
Under Section Two of this bill, the tax code would be
amended to index the basis of capital assets by the applicable
inflation adjustment.2 The applicable inflation adjustment is
the percentage, if any,3 by which the chain type price index for
GDP4 of the last quarter ending before the asset is disposed
exceeds the chain type price for the last quarter ending prior to
when the asset was obtained by the taxpayer.5 As currently
proposed, Section Two applies only to capital assets such as
stock in a C Corporation or tangible property.' It does not
1 S. 1635, 105th Cong. (1998).
2 See id. § 1022(c)(1).
3 If there is deflation, so the chain type index for the previous quarter is less
than the index at the time of the purchase, Senate Bill 1635 does not adjust the
gain upwards. Under a plain reading of the bill, the inflation adjustment only
exists when the price index for the last quarter exceeds the price index for the
previous one. In other words, inflation will lower the taxable gain, but deflation
will not raise it.
' The index most likely would be the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"). See infra
note 105 and accompanying text.
See S. 1635 § 1022(c)(2)(B).
6 See id. § 1022(b)(1)(A)-(B).
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apply to creditors' interests, preferred stock, options, net lease
property, or stock in a personal or S Corporation.'
Prior to 1998,' this same idea was proposed, but ultimate-
ly rejected, in a bill before the Senate in 1978.? It was again
considered in the Treasury Department's tax report in 1983.10
The Republicans, who gained control of the House of Represen-
tatives in their victorious elections of 1994, included such a
proposal in their "Contract with America"" in 1994 and in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.12 None of these proposals have
succeeded by passage into law.
Economists began to take note of the effect of inflation on
capital gains during the period of high inflation in the
1970s. 3 In an era of high inflation, 4 investors can realize
nominal gains while actually suffering losses in spending pow-
er. For example, someone who earns 9% during a 10% infla-
tionary period has less actual spending power. The current
method of calculating capital gains, measuring someone's ini-
tial investment in the pre-inflation dollar, while measuring the
gain in post-inflationary dollars, has been aptly described as
the theoretical equivalent of measuring the initial investment
in French Francs and the profit in Italian Lires. 5 One sug-
gested measure to correct this problem is to index the basis of
See id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)-(E).
' For a historical analysis of why this debate was first raised in the 1970s,
see Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 537 (1993) [hereinafter
Shuldiner, Indexing].
' See Revenue Bill of 1978, H.R. 13511 (1948).
10 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984).
" The "Contract With America" was the term used by the Republican party in
1994, after they gained control of Congress for the first time in 50 years, to de-
scribe their mandate, which consisted of acts to lower both taxes and government
spending. See Reed Shuldiner, Index the Code, Not Capital Gains, 79 TAX NOTES
225 (1998) [hereinafter Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains].
12 See id.
13 See Shuldiner, Indexing, supra note 8.
In a period of low inflation (e.g., 2%), far fewer investments will turn a
nominal profit while simultaneously suffering a spending power loss. This is large-
ly because there is less room under the inflation rate to earn a profit that is less
than the cost of inflation.
"1 See Shuldiner, Indexing, supra note 8, at 550.
[Vol. 65:3
INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS FOR INFLATION
the investment for inflation, thereby measuring the entire in-
vestment in one "currency."16 This measure has yet to be
adopted for either economic or political reasons.'1
Indexing the basis of capital gains for inflation would be a
boon to capital investors. 8 Investors who invest $100 and
earn 10% during a year with 5% inflation have a nominal gain
of $10, but in spending power, their $10 profit only nets them
a spending power gain of $4.7619 in pre-inflationary dollars.
Without inflation indexing, the investor is taxed for the entire
$10 at a rate of 28%20 for $2.80, which is more than half of
the investor's spending power gain. Inflation indexing would
adjust the basis by the applicable inflation adjustment,2' in
this case 5%, so that the invested basis would be $105. The
taxable gain would then be $5 and the tax paid $1.40. Thus,
the investor, by having tax liability limited to "real" gains,
saves 50%.
However, inflation indexing comes at a cost to government
revenue.22 Every dollar that the taxpayer saves is "lost" by
the Treasury. Accordingly, most, if not all, of that lost revenue
will have to come from other sources or require a reduction in
government spending. However, if ignoring inflation is indeed
an improper approach to taxation, then the lost revenue ratio-
nale for not indexing the revenue should be either replaced
from other sources or the government should reduce spend-
ingY On the other hand, if the argument for indexing is not
iS See id.; Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11.
17 See Bruce Bartlett, Inflation and Capital Gains, 75 TAX NOTES 1263 (1997).
is Note that as proposed in Senate Bill 1635, the asset is only indexed when
the chain price index at disposal of the asset exceeds the chain type index at the
time of purchase. Thus a taxpayer's basis can only be increased (decreasing the
taxable gain and the tax payment) and not decreased by this measure. See S.
1635, 105th Cong. § 1022(c)(2)(B) (1998).
"s At 5% inflation, where $105 at the end of the year only purchases what
$100 did at the beginning, an individual dollar purchases $95.24. Hence, $110,
where each dollar has the purchasing power of only $95.24, yields only $104.76 in
purchasing power.
20 For simplicity, the reader should assume a hypothetical 28% rate, which
historically has been the capital gains tax rate and remains one of the rates for
short-term capital gains at the time of publication. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (1999).
21 For an explanation of the applicable inflation adjustment, see Senate Bill
1635, section 1022(c)(2)(B).
' See Bartlett, supra note 17; Harold Pepperell, Why The Capital Gains Tax Is
Fair, 67 TAX NOTES 131 (1995).
For such arguments, see generally Bartlett, supra note 17.
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so persuasive, and the imposition on capital gains taxpayers is
fair, then the loss in revenue is likely too high a price to pay
for correcting a reasonable, albeit imperfect, code.24 Hence, if
such a measure is to be adopted, the proponents of inflation
indexing must pass a significant hurdle to demonstrate the
need and propriety for inflation indexing.
This idea has both currently, and in prior years, solicited
rich debate in law review articles' and media commentary.
This Note seeks to review that debate and then to add to its
calculus various economic factors that have only recently
emerged to determine whether those new economic realties
militate for or against the adoption of the proposal. This Note
seeks not only to analyze the merits of the specific bill recently
proposed,27 but to also provide an economic analysis to assist
in the future when new economic realities emerge and the
issue is again revisited.
Part I of this Note reviews the academic arguments both
for and against inflation indexing. Part II examines how
today's low inflation rates, the possibility of deflation, the con-
troversy over the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), 28 the growth
of mutual fund investing, and the emergence of computer tech-
nology interface with those arguments. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that for now, at least, such a bill is not warranted.
24 See generally Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11.
' See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 17; Charles Cooper et al., The Legal Authority
of the Department of the Treasury to Promulgate a Regulation Providing for Index-
ation of Capital Gains, 12 VA. TAX REV. 631 (1993); Nodl B. Cunningham &
Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX. L. REV. 319
(1993); Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for Policymaking,
73 MINN. L. REV. 1217 (1989); Shuldiner, Indexing, supra note 8; Shuldiner, Not
Capital Gains, supra note 11; Pepperell, supra note 22; Joseph Snoe, Tax Simpli-
fication and Fairness: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 61 (1996).
26 See Martin Feldstein, Why Capital Gains Taxes Are Unfair, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 1994, at A16; Norman G. Fosback, Stop Taxing Phantom Capital Gains,
MUTUAL FUND MAG., Sept. 1998, at 3.
27 See S. 1635, 105th Cong. (1998).
The CPI is measured by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, a federal agen-
cy in the United States Department of Labor, for the purpose, inter alia, of deter-
mining Social Security entitlements. See NORMAN FRUMKIN, GUIDE TO ECONOMIC
INDICATORS 87, 91 (2d ed. 1994).
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I. THE CLASSIC CASE FOR INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS AND
RESPONSES TO IT
Tax policy is guided primarily by the goal of creating reve-
nue through proper taxation. 9 There is widespread agree-
ment that, in an ideal world, a tax code should consist only of
taxes that are both equitable and efficient.3 0 Equity, or fair-
ness, means that people with the same abilities to pay taxes
should carry the same tax burden."' Efficiency, in the context
of this Note, expresses the notion that, as taxes are an
externality on economic behavior, undue influence on economic
behavior from taxation would likely have an adverse macroeco-
nomic effect. Hence, a tax code that causes minimal interfer-
ence with individual economic choice is efficient. 2 For a sim-
ple example of an inefficient tax, a tax on capital gains at 99%
would likely interfere with taxpayers' willingness to invest in
stocks, and thus adversely affect the economy by preventing
the flow of investment capital. An efficient tax code would
successfully avoid such over-taxation and its consequences.
Another important tax policy goal is simplicity.3 Simplic-
ity has both equity and efficiency implications.' A complex
tax code can be inefficient if it compels taxpayers to invest too
much of their time (that would otherwise be devoted towards
productive economic activity) to figuring out their tax liabili-
ty.35 Also, a complex tax code can be inequitable, since vari-
ances in taxpayers' ability to understand a complex code can
lead to some taxpayers in similar economic and social circum-
stances (tax-paying ability) to carry different tax burdens due
to superior tax planning." Simplicity, in the context of infla-
tion indexing, is usually raised as an efficiency argument, and
will be treated accordingly in this Note.
Some of the arguments in the area of inflation indexing
are primarily driven by concerns of fairness to both the capital
See MICHAEL J. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ch. 1, § 4 (2d ed. 1988).
'° See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
3See id.
" See GRAETz, supra note 29, ch. 1, § 4.
See id.
, See id.
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gains taxpayer vis-h-vis the income taxpayer and vis-A-vis
other capital gains taxpayers. As capital investors are general-
ly perceived by society to be wealthy," the merit afforded
such arguments is often colored by one's political orienta-
tion. " Those arguments stand in contradistinction to the oth-
er class of arguments that are primarily driven by concerns of
economic efficiency. While economic theory itself is often moti-
vated by political philosophy, the latter set of arguments is
significantly less susceptible to the influence of political and
philosophical beliefs. Hence, the merit, or lack thereof, of an
economic efficiency argument will likely influence legislators
from all parts of the political and philosophical spectrums.
This distinction between equity- and efficiency-driven
arguments is also useful in this analysis. To properly break
down and appreciate the arguments that militate for or
against inflation indexing, it is helpful to consider those argu-
ments within the framework of their respective underlying
policy goals. Accordingly, this Note will try to address the
various arguments within the two discrete categories of equity
arguments and efficiency arguments.
A. Equity Arguments
The primary equity argument in favor of indexing the tax
code for capital gains is that one can potentially pay taxes for
a nominal gain, which represented an actual loss in real
spending power. This anomaly occurs when someone has a
gain that fails to outpace inflation. " While the investor's
nominal investment value has increased, the investor's real
purchasing power has actually decreased. To pay taxes in such
a situation strikes many taxpayers as unfair.
Furthermore, even in cases of a real gain, a large portion
of the gain often merely reflects inflation. Even in a period of
'7 See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 1265.
"See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
, As a simple example, consider someone who earns a 5% gain on a $10,000
investment in a period when inflation is at a rampant 10%. While the investor
may have more money ($10,500), the amount the investor would need simply to be
able to purchase the same number of goods as the investor could have purchased
prior to the investment is $11,000. Hence, the hapless investor has actually netted
a purchasing power loss from the investment.
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historically moderate inflation, say 4%, the inflation over five
years accumulates to 21.67%.4' Hence, someone who bought a
stock at $100 and sold it five years later at $150 realized a $50
nominal gain, but a real gain of only $23.28.41 When the en-
tire $50 nominal gain is taxed at 28%42 for $14, the hapless
investor has paid $14 in post-inflation dollars or $11.23 in pre-
inflation dollars, which is nearly one-half of the real gain. Such
a high rate of taxation also causes taxpayers to question the
equity of the current code.'
In an equitable tax system, an equal gain among two tax-
payers should provide an equal tax payment. According to
Nobel Prize-winning economist James M. Buchanan, "[olne of
the most widely accepted principles or norms for the distribu-
tion of taxes among individuals states that individuals in simi-
lar situations should be treated similarly, or in other words,
equals should be treated equally."' This concept is often de-
scribed as "horizontal equity."' 5 A similar concept, sometimes
referred to as "vertical equity' is that non-equals should not
be treated equally.
Failure to account for inflation yields results inconsistent
with these equities. For example, consider the following two
investors.47 Investor A begins a $1,000 investment prior to a
10-year period of high inflation, and Investor B also invests
40 This is 4% compounded over five years.
41 This surprisingly dramatic effect of 21.67% inflation eating away over 50% of
a profit is easily understood when one breaks down an investment into its princi-
ple and profit. While the $50 profit after 21.67% inflation is only lessened by
about $9, the inflation also lowers the value of the principle creating a loss in
that part of the investment of $18. Cumulatively, a loss of $27 due to inflation
takes place. Hence, even modest inflation can have a serious impact on how capi-
tal gains are taxed.
4' This rate was assumed for illustrative purposes; however, capital gains rates
may be lower for an investor depending on the investor's tax bracket and the
term of investment.
See Shuldiner, Indexing, supra note 8.
JAMES BuCHANAN, THE PUBLIC FINANCES 165 (1960), quoted in Cooper et al.,
supra note 25, at 638.
"This term was coined by the Musgraves in RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE AND PEG-
GY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 216 (2d ed. 1976),
quoted in Cooper et al., supra note 25, at 638.
" GRAETZ, supra note 29, ch. 1, § 4.
" See Cooper et al., supra note 25, at 638 (describing this scenario as one
where equals are not treated equally). However, a more accurate description is, as
presented here, that the converse of non-equals getting equal treatment is what
actually occurs.
1999]
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$1,000, but in the beginning of the 9th year of that same peri-
od. Suppose they both realize nominal gains of 50% and are
taxed, accordingly, as equals. In fact, however, as explained
earlier,48 Investor A's principal has decreased substantially
via inflation, while Investor B's has not. Yet the tax code ig-
nores this disparity and treats them the same. Accordingly, it
has been argued that the current tax code violates critical
equity norms and that indexing the basis of capital gains for
inflation is necessary to make the code equitable.,9
Furthermore, while the capital gains taxpayer's liability is
affected by inflation, the income taxpayer's is not because the
income tax is paid in inflationary dollars. ° While the capital
gains tax is also paid in inflationary dollars, the gain is calcu-
lated by subtracting the basis from the return. Since, absent
accounting for inflation, the capital gain is artificially high,
paying inflationary dollars as a tax does not correct the inaccu-
racy in the calculation of the real amount of the capital
gain.5' Because the tax is levied on an artificial gain, paying
in inflationary dollars does not fully correct the inaccuracy in
the capital gains tax liability. The income tax taxpayer, howev-
er, has no basis and therefore upon paying in inflationary
dollars suffers no inaccuracy due to inflation.52 Hence, only
some taxpayers are affected by inflation, but the code treats
them all the same, thus violating equitable norms.
B. The Equitable Unindexed Code Arguments
The premise for the equity arguments in favor of indexing
is that due to inflation, and the failure of the code to recognize
inflation, the code often subjects capital gains investors to an
unfairly high tax and does not provide "horizontal equity."3
Many believe the solution to these problems is to attack them
at the source by indexing the code.' While no explanation has
been offered that definitively resolves the apparent injustices
See Cooper et al. supra note 25, at 638.
See Cooper et al., supra note 25, at 638.
'0 See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 236.
5 See id; supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52 See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 236.
"See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
" See generally Cooper et al., supra note 25; Feldstein, supra note 26.
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demonstrated in the hypotheticals above,55 commentators have
made strong arguments that capital gains taxpayers are
not unfairly taxed on the whole, and that better solutions
than indexing exist for solving some of the injustices that
occasionally arise.
1. Philosophical Arguments
Not everyone agrees that capital gains taxpayers are simi-
larly situated to income taxpayers. One such equity argument
that justifies an unindexed tax rate on capital gains is that
capital gains taxes most often affect wealthier taxpayers.56
Hence, effectively high capital gains taxation is consistent with
a progressive tax. This rationale can, in fact, be applied more
broadly to justify a high capital gains tax even on taxpayers
with lower income. Money invested for capital gains does not
usually consist of living expense money. Instead, it often comes
from the taxpayer's disposable income. Disposable income, by
its nature, is income that one is more easily able to afford to
spend, dispose of, or pay taxes with. The marginal utility of
wealth that helps justify a progressive tax system likewise
justifies progressively taxing income that the taxpayers
indicate has marginal utility by placing it at risk. Therefore,
even the less affluent taxpayer is being charged taxes on in-
come of marginal utility, an income from which the taxpayer
can afford to pay taxes. Accordingly, there is no compelling
equity argument that the capital gains taxpayer must have
horizontal equity with the income taxpayer, since the capital
gains taxpayer can more easily afford to pay a higher tax on
the capital gains than the income taxpayer can afford to pay
on the income.
This rationale comports with the theories of Margaret
Radin,57 who has posited that certain property which is not of
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56 See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 1265 (suggesting that opponents of inflation
indexing are motivated by progressive taxation). In fact, statistics do indicate a
direct relationship between a family's income and the percentage of a family's
assets in stock investments. However, the gap is narrowing. See U.S. DEPT OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 532 tbl. 842 (118th ed.
1998) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. "
'7 See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 978
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a personhood value deserves less protection than property that
has personhood value.5" Personhood property is property with
which the owner's sense of self-worth is identified.59 For ex-
ample, barring exceptional circumstances, most taxpayers are
not likely to risk property such as their primary residence,
which has a high personhood value. It follows that property
invested at risk in capital markets that produces earnings
often without an investor's actual work has very little
personhood value.'
Therefore, one might argue that it is fair to tax such capi-
tal gains more harshly for the purpose of redistributing proper-
ty so that other, less fortunate, citizens can receive property
with potentially greater personhood value. Hence, relatively
high taxes on capital gains comport with the notion of taxing
those who can afford to pay, even if the individual investor is
not particularly wealthy. It follows that a greater tax burden
for capital gains is consistent with a progressive tax, regard-
less of the individual taxpayer's wealth. It is also consistent
with horizontal equity"' because the capital gains taxpayer is
inapposite to the income tax taxpayer and need not be accord-
ed the same tax treatment.
(1982). The author posits that "property for personhood gives rise to a stronger
moral claim than other property." Id This position has been used to justify grant-
ing to a tenant of an apartment whose personhood is defined by the tenancy,
under certain circumstances, property rights adverse to those of the actual owner
or landlord, who often considers the dwelling a capital investment and has little
personhood attachment to the property. This view is not conventional, particularly
because it leads to a validation of the Marxist theory of awarding property to the
one who gains it from personal labor, over the Lockean theory of just acquisition.
See id. at 979. However, in taxation, which is a justified property transfer from
the individual to the community, it is more mainstream.
"8 See id. at 978.
59 See id.
" It is true that this rationale cannot explain a high tax on the capital gains
of residential real estate, which is both the quintessential personhood property,
and the capital gain enjoyed by more Americans than any other. However, histori-
cally, residential real estate was not taxed when the owner reinvested the pro-
ceeds into a principal residence and the owner thus retained his or her property's
personhood value. See 26 U.S.C. § 1034, repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-34, tit. HI,
§ 312(b), 111 Stat. 839 (Aug. 5, 1997). Furthermore, in 1997, the tax code provid-
ed a $250,000 exclusion on proceeds from residential real estate. See I.R.C. § 121
(1999).
" See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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However, this argument is flawed in the situation where
someone is taxed on a nominal gain that represents an actual
loss, since the cash invested and lost to inflation is likely no
longer disposable. 2 In addition, some capital gains are the
result of low risk investments, and may well have as much
personhood value as income. Moreover, capital gains are often
the product of retirement and savings plans," and as such
they represent the future livelihood income of many taxpayers.
Furthermore, the lower nominal rate on capital gains tax as
opposed to income tax does not imply a congressional intent to
tax capital gains at a rate above income tax. Rather, it implies
a congressional intent to treat capital gains as less taxable
than income. In addition, this does not address the unequal
treatment accorded among capital gains taxpayers because the
current code ignores inflation."'
While important to be aware of, standing alone, the pro-
gressive tax argument does not fully defend the current tax
policy. The argument likely influences those members of Con-
gress who view taxes as a means of wealth distribution and
therefore view capital gains as an area ripe for harvesting
funds for the poor. In addition, it does provide somewhat of an
equitable defense in the situations where the gain does reflect
otherwise disposable income.
2. Practical Arguments
The primary argument that the current code's failure to
index for inflation is, in fact, fair is that the lower rates for
capital gains tax in comparison to ordinary income ameliorate
this inequity."5 Clearly, this is only a partial defense of not
indexing capital gains for inflation, since investors can have
2 See supra note 14 (noting that this phenomenon is not prevalent during
periods of low inflation).
" With regard to the argument that people's retirement savings are unfairly
taxed, see infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the deferment prin-
ciple).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 236. Capital gains are
taxed currently at 28% for assets held for less than 12 months and 20% for assets
held for longer than that period. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(B) (1999). Income tax depends
on the taxpayer's bracket, but capital gains can be paid as ordinary income if the
taxpayer's income bracket is lower than the capital gains rate. See id. § 1(h).
1999]
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actual losses and still pay taxes, albeit at a lower rate.6
Thus, it fails to address those situations where actual losses
are treated as taxable gains. Furthermore, as illustrated earli-
er,67 even when inflation is fairly low, the inflationary effect
produces a capital gains tax at over 50%, which is significantly
higher than the income tax rate for Americans in the highest
income tax bracket. However, this rationale is important since
it does somewhat ameliorate many of the effects of inflation
and it can be combined with other rationales.
The most persuasive argument that not indexing capital
gains is, in fact, fair rests upon the deferring principle.' Cap-
ital gains taxes are paid not on an accrual basis, but when
they are realized.69 This leads to the counter-intuitive notion
that the longer the term of an investment, the less it is affect-
ed by inflation.7' This notion assumes that every year a prof-
itable investment is held, investors are treated to a deferral of
their tax obligations if they merely hold on to their invest-
ments. Theoretically, the longer one defers, the more benefits
he reaps, and this benefit compensates for inflation. More-
over, the damage done by inflation to an investment that is
not taken into account by the tax code is the loss of principal
value due to inflation.71 In a profitable investment, the princi-
pal occupies its greatest percentage of an investment in the
early years, and the ratio of principal to profit, if the in-
vestment continues to succeed, shrinks every year.72
" It is unclear if this situation occurs frequently enough, so that a capital
investor cannot ultimately compensate for those individual situations by paying a
lower tax in the majority of capital gains throughout the taxpayer's lifetime.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See Shuldiner, Indexing, supra note 8.
, See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221, 1222 (1999).
70 See Durst, supra note 25; Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at
237.
71 See supra note 41. Consider that in the hypothetical of the $50 nominal
profit, discussed supra note 41, if the inflation would have only decreased the
profit portion of the investment and not the basis, it would have resulted in an
actual profit of $41 instead of $23. The $14 paid in the post-inflationary dollars
equals $11 in pre-inflation dollars and both represent 28% of their respective prof-
its. The injustice here is created because the loss to the basis is not accounted for.
Therefore, any activity that minimizes the effect of the value of principal on the
success of the investment will minimize the ramification of not accounting for
inflation.
"' For example, take an investment that earns 10% a year. At the point of
investment the principle is 100% of the equity. At the end of one year the invest-
[Vol. 65:3
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Hence the longer the term, the less important the current
value of the original principal, and the inflation impact is
diminished accordingly.73
Deferral is not a cure for the ill of inflationary taxes, rath-
er it is an advantage that the capital gain taxpayer has over
the income tax taxpayer.74 This advantage, coupled with a
lower rate of taxation, arguably offsets the disadvantage of
inflationary taxation. Some commentators have stated that,
due to deferral and the lower rate of taxation for capital gains,
the average effective burden of the capital gains taxpayer has
indeed been lower than the average effective burden of the
income tax taxpayer.75 Notwithstanding this, the fact remains
that deferral and a low rate combine to merely provide rough
justice for the capital investor. The advantage of deferral is a
nominal benefit calculated by discounting the ultimate pay-
ment for the terms that the payment is deferred. Likewise, the
lower rate for capital gains is a nominal advantage. Therefore,
while in periods of low inflation these two benefits will likely
outweigh the cost of inflationary taxation, in high inflationary
years they are less likely to do so.76
ment is worth $110, and the principle is now 91% of the investment. At the end
of year two the investment is worth $121, and the principal represents only 83%
of the investment. This process of shrinking the principle proportion continues
each year.
" See infra note 87 and accompanying text (stating that it is not wise policy
to induce people to over defer or "lock in7).
" See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 237.
" See i&
It might be helpful to compare mathematically the future earnings of an
investment under the current tax code for capital gains to one under an accrual
but indexed code, which resembles the tax structure for income tax. See supra
notes 50-52 and accompanying text. Assume that the investment will earn a fixed
percentage return each year. If P is the original principal and i is the percentage
earned and n is the term of years then P(1 i) n or V is the pretax future value.
Since the investor pays a rate (r) on the profit, the after tax value is V-r(V-P).
Under an accrual code an investor would pay out taxes every year. Hence, at the
end of one year the investor has P(1 i(1-r) Ir) where I is the inflation rate. (The
investor pays ri in taxes hence keeps (1-r)i of the profit and has the inflation
portion of the investment not taxed represented by Ir. This return is compounded
every year resulting in P(1 i(1-r) Ir)An. The critical difference between the invest-
ments is therefore i (for an investment under current rules) vs. i(1-r) Ir (for the
hypothetical code). Since these terms are compounded, these terms determine
which investment will eventually have a greater return, notwithstanding that mod-
el one requires a tax payment on the profit at the end of the investment. Accord-
ingly, these terms are related such that if I/i > 1 or the inflation rate is higher
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Others have argued that investors who leverage through
debt benefit from inflation since they pay their debts back in
post-inflation dollars even though they borrowed in pre-infla-
tion dollars.7 Hence, they contend that by leveraging, inves-
tors can compensate for their losses due to inflation." In addi-
tion, by following this strategy, the investor will also be able to
minimize the gap of time between the investment input and
the gain on investment. The investment input, in this case the
loan payments, will occur at periods closer to the investment
realization than the original investment. This strategy of mini-
mizing the time gap prevents inflation from accumulating, as
inflation by its nature needs time to accumulate, and therefore
the detrimental effect inflation has on the investment is corre-
spondingly diminished.
It has also been argued that indexing inflation for capital
gains would lead to tax dodging or tax arbitrage."9 Investors
would take an unindexed loss through leveraging and then pay
an indexed capital gain.8" In other words, investors would use
partially-indexed instruments to finance wholly-indexed
gains.81 The response to this argument is that the government
could, in fact, index the losses taken on leveraged investing.'
However, others have argued that this creates yet another
level of complexity to the code, and that similar, heretofore
than the return, model two will outperform model one. However, with a higher
rate of return model two will eventually (after sufficient terms) outperform model
one. Of course, the difference between the profit and the rate of inflation will have
a proportionate effect on the number of terms required before model one actually
outperforms model two. Hence, in periods of high inflation, it will take longer for
the deferral benefit to compensate for the failure of the code to account for infla-
tion than during periods of low inflation. Accordingly, the plight of the capital
gains taxpayer in periods of low inflation, especially in light of the generally lower
rate for capital gains tax, is favorable to that of the income tax payer. Senate Bill
1635 proposes to not only index for inflation, but to also allow for deferral. See S.
1635, 105th Cong. § 1022 (1998) For more background on computing these and
similar formulae, see generally STEPHEN J. KELLISON, THE THEORY OF INTEREST
(2d ed. 1991).
' See Durst, supra note 25, at 1229.
78 See Durst, supra note 25, at 1229.
"' See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 1265; Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra
note 11, at 237.
so See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 237.
81 See id.
' See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 1265.
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undiscovered, schemes for tax arbitrage are likely to result
from inflation indexing."
The fallacy in the leveraging argument is that it rests
upon the assumption that lenders are unaware that the bor-
rower will be paying in inflationary dollars. It is more likely
that the lender will normally charge higher interest to compen-
sate for inflation, thereby passing the loss back to the investor.
Indeed, interest rates are often directly related to lenders'
perceptions of future inflation. Thus, the investor cannot really
compensate the tax burden created by inflation."
C. Efficiency Arguments
The tax goal of efficiency is to structure the tax code so
that it does not interfere with taxpayers' free economic choice
and allows them to act in a way that is most efficient for the
economy. Taxes are an externality influencing taxpayers' in-
vestment strategies. It follows that the tax code should not
discourage taxpayers from investing their money in what the
market would perceive, if not for the externality, as the "best"
investments. The "best" investments are usually in well-man-
aged companies; thus, an unbiased market prefers them.
Under Keynesian analysis,85 efficient capital raising from
,3 See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 237.
, See Durst, supra note 25.
' See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTER-
EST AND MONEY (1936). Among Keynes's many theories is the notion that a failure
of efficient capital raising is not self-correcting and therefore can cause an econo-
my to suffer permanent rather then temporary malaise. Under the classic model,
too much money in the household sector leads to inflation through
overconsumption by consumers and high interest rates as a result of a credit
crunch. On the other hand, too much money in the business sector leads to reces-
sion through insufficient consumer spending and a corresponding dearth of
entrepeneurial opportunities. Accordingly, Keynes concluded that if the capital in
the business sector exceeds the household sector by a certain point, then the pri-
vate sector will increase its rate of contraction since workers will be laid off, mak-
ing the gap between the sectors permanent absent government intervention. The
high unemployment and simultaneous inflation of the 1970s seemed to discredit
Keynes, since in his analysis high unemployment should lead to less consumer
consumption and hence low inflation. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, Some Tax Advice
for Latvia and Other Similarly Situated Emerging Economies, 13 INTL TAX & Bus.
LAW. 223, 238 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Bud-
gets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1171 (1998). Apparently, the increased disparity of
wealth between rich and poor has made unemployment an inaccurate determinant
of household sector capital, and so the gap between the business and household
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the household sector to the business sector is critical in order
to sustain long-term, healthy economic growth. The greater
percentage of capital that is raised by superior investments,
the greater the allocative efficiency of the nation's assets. More
of the nation's investment capital will be in superior compa-
nies, who presumably will produce superior products more
efficiently, thus benefiting the entire economy."
Conversely, if the tax code is overbearing, it will not pro-
mote taxpayers to invest in the "best" investments. Rather,
due to the externality, taxpayers will contribute capital to
relatively inferior business enterprises while many superior
enterprises will not succeed, either in whole or in part, for lack
of adequate capitalization. This reduction in allocative effi-
ciency can lead to inferior macroeconomic results and a drag in
the economy."
Someone who has already invested in a company for some
time may have a strong disincentive to pull out of the invest-
ment, even if a healthier one comes along, because of the addi-
tional cost of the capital gains tax. Accordingly, money may
remain in inferior enterprises due to an externality that makes
sector during the 1970s was, in fact, inflationary. See ROBERT HEILBRONER &
LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED 63 (3d ed. 1994). The most controversial
implication of Keynes's theories is that government intervention is a critical com-
ponent to a healthy economy as a necessary vehicle for efficiently moving capital
from the private to the public sector. For an introduction to Keynes, see id. at 39-
43.
86 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 344. The conventional view is
that the securities markets impact allocative efficiency. This view is the accepted
economic justification for the enormous public expense to fund the Securities and
Exchange Commission. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 730-33 (1984). A
more informed securities market increases allocative efficiency, thus offsetting the
public's cost of administrative regulation. See id.; Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B.
Laffier, Information and Capital Markets, 44 BUS. J. 289 (1971). But see Lynn
Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Analysis, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 644-645 (1988) (presenting
the contrary position that there is a general "unimportance of equity as a source
of capital" for business enterprises, and hence the equity markets have little im-
pact on allocative efficiency). Accordingly, a supporter of this minority position
would certainly not find arguments to index capital gains for inflation in order to
correct lock in inefficiencies, which at most exist in the secondary securities mar-
kets to be persuasive. However, this is not the widely accepted view, and most
economists believe that efficient secondary securities markets increase overall
allocative efficiency. See Coffee, supra, at 733.
87 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 344.
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it more marketable to the locked-in investor. This impedes
the flow of money to the best investments and creates a
drag in economic efficiency. This "lock in" effect has been
called "the most serious argument in favor of a capital gains
preference."'
Under the current code, taxpayers have an incentive to
avoid paying a capital gains tax, which fails to account for
inflation, and is thus arguably inordinately high. One method
available for investors to avoid or minimize the tax is to hold
or defer the investment.89 Because the tax code does not im-
pose a tax for accrued gains, but rather only for realized gains,
the tax payment is likewise deferred." Although eventually
upon the realization of the gain, a tax will be paid, the investor
benefits greatly through deferral." In addition, the investor
can hold the investment until death when it may receive estate
tax exemptions. Therefore, taxpayers have an incentive to lock
in their investments, not only for accrual benefits, but because
it is the only way to avoid an arguably punitive tax.
It is true that any accrual system for capital gains tax
creates a lock in incentive, since investors will try to have their
gains remain unrealized for as long as possible so as to avoid
paying the capital gains tax. The proponents of inflation index-
ing argue that the inflation element changes the lock on inves-
tors from an ordinary fence to one with barbed wire9 2 They
contend that an inflation indexed capital gains tax would be a
necessary but relatively innocuous externality, while the pres-
ent onerous, burdensome, and unfair capital gains tax is a
more influential and hence far more dangerous externality.
88 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 344.
8See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 1001 (1999).
81 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 68. The benefit of deferral is the difference between paying
the tax now or a year later. The difference between the future value and the pres-
ent value of the tax liability, the amount the taxpayer would have earned in in-
terest by investing the money for the period prior to paying the tax, is, mathe-
matically, the tax multiplied by its expected rate of return. Therefore, the higher
the tax liability, the greater the incentive to defer paying the tax. An investment
will have to be that much more profitable, and hence more risky, to compensate
for the loss of paying the tax early. Furthermore, some investors simply do not
ever remove their investment in order to avoid the capital gains tax by bequeath-
ing it tax free. See I.R.C. §§ 102(a); 1014.
1999]
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
Others9 3 have argued that the lock in situation is somewhat
unavoidable under our accrual system,9' and that the addi-
tional economic effect of not indexing inflation has on the econ-
omy is exaggerated. 5 There is no clear conclusion to this de-
bate of how much economic damage lock in actually causes or
how much lock in is directly attributable to not indexing capi-
tal gains for inflation.'
This lock in argument is potentially compelling in favor of
inflation indexing. The equity arguments focus upon the puta-
tive unfairness to capital investors, which many lawmakers
consider dubious since capital investors are supposedly
wealthy. 7 The lock in argument is the strongest one ad-
vanced that the failure to index has adverse effects on the
national economy. Hence, if its effect is in fact significant
and correctable, then regardless of political orientation, most
observers would agree to indexing the code. Therefore, it is
important to analyze if economic changes imply that the puta-
tive lock in effect likely exists today.9
A second form of lock in exists when an investor who
would otherwise reinvest a gain refrains from doing so to avoid
tax liability. The investor who would personally prefer to buy a
house is locked into an investment that is producing paper
income but has little utility. Some economists have voiced
concern that the capital gains tax prevents investors from
enjoying the returns on their investments. Economists consider
the likelihood that this form of lock in exists to be greater than
3 See Snoe, supra, note 25, at 78.
' Some commentators have in fact argued for a tax liability on accrued gains
instead of realized gains in large part because of lock in. See, e.g., Fred D. Brown,
Complete Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1559, 1570 (1995).
' See infra Part II. (discussing whether the growth of mutual fund investing
provides supports to this argument at least for the present time).
96 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 345 & n.1O1 (concluding that
whether lock in imposes a significant onus on the economy is unclear). Most com-
mentators conclude that the putative lock in effect most likely impacts the ability
of start up companies or newer companies. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note
25, at 345. Established corporate giants likely have sufficient investors locked into
them to offset any difficulty in attracting new equity investors. See Cunningham &
Schenk, supra note 25, at 345.
" See Bartlett, supra note 17.
See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 345.
"See infra Part II.B.1 (analyzing whether increased mutual fund investment
impacts the macroeconomic effects of lock in).
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the likelihood that lock in prevents efficient national allocation
of investment capital.'
However, this variant of the lock in argument has less
broad influence than the macroeconomic one, since those who
believe that capital gains investors should have to pay a high
tax are not likely troubled by wealthy investors' difficulties in
fully enjoying the fruits of tax-deferred investments. In addi-
tion, this lock in is at most a higher effective tax on capital
gains. Furthermore, this additional tax burden, in fact, is a
creation of the capital investors themselves. It is only the goal
of earning or keeping even more money that prompts investors
to voluntarily lock in profitable investments and avoid tax
liability via accrual. Hence, this argument is actually a weaker
form of the equity arguments articulated earlier and is, there-
fore, well answered by the responses to the equity arguments
discussed above.' '
D. An Indexed Code's Ability to Remedy Inequities
In 1990, the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA")
authored a strongly-worded opinion against inflation index-
ing. 2 In its report, it advanced arguments that basis index-
ing itself is not an entirely accurate remedy for the inequity of
paying taxes on inflationary gains.' °3 First, it argued that
there is no real way to accurately measure inflation, and so
any indexing would, thus, by extension, be inaccurate.'
Inflation statistics such as the Consumer Price Index
("CPI") estimate inflation based on means and aggregates.0 5
The method uses a "market basket" based on data collected
from a survey of about 20,000 families, who provide informa-
tion on their buying habits.' 6 The Bureau of Labor and Sta-
tistics then measures changes in the price of these goods by
® See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 345-46.
o See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
zo See New York State Bar Association Ad Hoc Committee on Indexation of Ba-
sis, Report on Inflation Adjustments to the Basis of Capital Assets, 48 TAX NOTES
759 (1990) [hereinafter NYSBA].
10 See id. at 773.
104 See id.
106 See ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MACRO ECONOMICS
182 (3d ed. 1990).
106 Id.
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surveying a wide variety of retail establishments."°7 These
are not exact measures. Rather, the measures are drawn from
the consumers whose purchasing habits and costs are gleaned
from the surveys. While, based on probability theory, it is true
that the survey is assumed to have some degree of mathemati-
cal accuracy,0 8 many economists believe that the conditions
necessary to achieve true accuracy from such a survey rarely
exist in an actual economy.0 9  Hence, the NYSBA argues
that the CPI and similar available price indexes are not
exact measures, and any inflation adjustment would be only
a rough estimate.
Second, the NYSBA stated that "basis adjustments will
match inflationary increases by happenstance.""0  The
NYSBA argues that, if someone holds a capital asset and infla-
tion occurs, the inflation percentage should be calculated as it
affects the market value of the asset, not the investor's ba-
sis."' As an example, the NYSBA hypothesizes two investors
who invest $100 for two years with 10% inflation annually.
Invester A earns nothing during the first year and $21 during
the second. Investor B earns $15 during the first year and $6
during the second. Using inflation indexing, neither of the
investors would have to pay because their profits do not exceed
the loss to inflation."' However, the NYSBA argues that the
basis for Investor A at the end of year two should be indexed
at $120 instead of $121."' This is because the 10% inflation
that occurred at the end of year one affected the investor's
asset when the asset was worth $100; thus, the 10% increase
should be $10. Under the same reasoning, Investor B should
1" See id.
108 See Richard G. Anderson et al., Monetary Aggregation Theory and Statistical
Index Numbers, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan. 11, 1997, at 31.
109 See id. The difficulty reflects the variance of distribution about the mean,
which renders the mean not perfectly accurate for measuring spending habits. For
example, if there are equal amounts of consumers on both sides of the mean con-
sumer, and with an equal variance from the mean a normal distribution curve
exists. The mean or aggregate will be more accurate then if some consumers, due
to individual extreme habits not balanced on the other end of the spectrum, are
able to distort the mean. See id.
10 NYSBA, supra note 102, at 773.
m See id.
' At the end of year one, their bases are adjusted 10% to $110, and at the
end of year two, to $121.
1 See NYSBA, supra note 102.
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have her basis increased by $15, making the basis $125. In
short, the NYSBA argues that, when the investment grows at
variable rates, as investments often do, the inflationary ad-
justment is not wholly accurate.""
This latter argument of the NYSBA is dubious. While it is
true that the inflation only affected the amount Investor A had
at the end of year one, this approach of focusing on the asset's
market value disregards the loss that Investor A took at the
end of year one in terms of real dollars." 5 In a tax system
that taxes capital gains upon realization rather than accrual,
the best way to look at the investment is to calculate each
investor's spending power gain from the beginning of the in-
vestment until the date that gain is realized. This is achieved
by measuring the dollars invested and ultimately returned.
Using that approach, both Investor A and Investor B need to
earn $121 at the end of year two to outpace inflation and real-
ize any spending power gain.
The NYSBA would likely concede that the inflation adjust-
ment is still more accurate than no adjustment at all. While it
may be impossible to measure inflation perfectly, we still rely
on the CPI to determine tax brackets".6 and Social Security
entitlements."' It is still a widely-accepted and utilized esti-
mate. In addition, granted that the NYSBA asserts that even
accurately-measured inflation cannot index investments per-
fectly,"' inflation indexing comes substantially closer than
the current system to taxing investors' real purchasing power
gains. However, the gravamen of the NYSBA's argument is
that, notwithstanding limited improvements in tax equity from
inflation indexing, considering the imperfections and costs of
inflation indexing, there are other simpler and superior meth-
ods of compensating the capital gains taxpayer, such as, lower
capital gains rates.
114 See id.
"' See supra note 41 and accompanying text. If Investor A converted his pre-
investment cash to post-investment cash where every $1 is worth only about 90€,
and still received only $100, that would be a 10% loss.
"" See 26 I.R.C. § 1(f) (1999).
117 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 907 (1999).
'is See NYSBA, supra note 102.
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E. The Inefficiency of an Indexed Code
Opponents of indexing have also argued that indexing
itself will create an economic inefficiency. Indexing adds yet
another layer of complexity to the code, which is inimical to
the goal of tax simplicity."' Economists generally assert that
the most efficient economy has the lowest information costs.
Information costs do not actually produce anything for the
economy, but are merely costs incurred by those who wish to
produce for the economy. Hence, lower information costs allow
producers to spend more time on the actual production of goods
than on gathering information. This leads to a more efficient
allocation of the nation's resources.2
A more complicated tax code requires more taxpayers to
hire tax advisors who will in turn charge higher prices for a
more difficult service. It follows that a tax code that will index
inflation and be more complex will require more information
costs and create an economic inefficiency. Therefore, opponents
of indexing argue that it is better to simply have a low rate for
capital gains taxes, which we arguably have, 2' than to index
capital gains tax for inflation.
The force of the simplicity argument against inflation
indexing depends significantly on how much weight one be-
lieves should be given to simplicity (when crafting a tax code),
in comparison to equity and efficiency. In light of the terrific
complexities that the current unindexed code presently con-
tains,"'2 and the additional complexities created by the amor-
phous state of federal taxation law, it is dubious that anyone
finds that the concern that inflation indexing is inimical to
simplicity is persuasive. Simplicity is not a policy to which
lawmakers have granted much deference. In addition, many
foreign countries with far less administrative capability than
119 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (defining "simplicity").
20 See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 42 (2d
ed. 1994).
121 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
1" See Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1999, at Al (reporting
that the IRS's national taxpayer advocate, Val Oveson, testified in his first report
before Congress that the current state of tax law complexity is "the most serious
and burdensome problem facing taxpayers"). This suggests that caution is appro-
priate prior to ascribing significant weight to the simplicity argument as a prima-
ry reason why Congress has not adopted indexing capital gains for inflation.
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the U.S. have successfully implemented inflation indexing for
capital gains.' More likely, opponents of inflation indexing
consider the loss of simplicity to be an additional factor,
among other more persuasive factors, militating against in-
dexing the code.
F. Summary
In sum, proponents of indexing have argued that the cur-
rent code's blind eye to the effect of inflation on the real profit
of investments creates inequitable results. Furthermore, in
order to avoid such results many investors lock in to their
investments creating allocative inefficiency of America's capital
resources. Opponents of indexing do not deny that there may
ocdasionally be unjust results. However, they contend, first,
that there are other advantages that the capital gains taxpayer
has, such as deferral opportunities and a lower rate, which
offset the occasional injustice.' Second, they contend that
inflation indexing is an inexact and expensive approach to
correcting the occasional injustice created by ignoring inflation
in the tax code.2 s Third, they contend that any lock in effect
on the economy is alternatively inevitable and somewhat exag-
gerated. 6 Accordingly, opponents of indexing argue that
there is no justification for the loss of revenue that would occur
with inflation indexing.
Until today, at least, the opponents of indexing have been
victorious; inflation indexing has not been adopted. It is plausi-
ble that the failure of Congress to ever index the code indicates
that the national will, after a thorough consideration of the
issues, is not to index. The question that remains to be an-
swered is whether recent economic changes will have any im-
pact on the debate.
See Bartlett, supra note 17, at 1265.
124 See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
" It is possible that inertia, see Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11,
at 237, lack of populism in such a proposal, and the fear of losing revenue that
would be hard to replace also played a role. However, it is also possible that
Congress's inaction does imply that inflation indexing was not a correct response
for any of the reasons articulated earlier. See supra Part I.
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II. THE EFFECT OF CURRENT ECONOMIC TRENDS ON INFLATION
INDEXING
Recently, significant and potentially long-term changes in
the economy have emerged, whose respective impacts on the
wisdom of indexing capital gains for inflation justify consider-
ation. These economic developments include: (a) the recent
reduction in inflation coupled with warnings of deflation in the
forthcoming years, (b) the emergence of the mutual fund as a
leading financial intermediary, and (c) technological advances
and their effect on information costs.
A. Current Inflation Trends
1. Low Inflation and its Impact on Fairness
During the late 1970s America faced double digit inflation,
as measured by the CPI. In 1978, inflation was 7.6%;" in
1979, 11.3%;129 and in 1980, 13.5%.131 In contrast, inflation
in 1997 was at 1.7%.13' From 1992 to 1995 it was under 3%
per annum.'32 In short, inflation in recent years has been un-
usually low; thus, inflation's impact on capital investors is
much less significant now than it has ever been. Conversely,
the benefit that the capital gains investor has over the income
tax taxpayer, the ability to defer taxes, is reduced.133 Accord-
ingly, if there was a rationale for not indexing for inflation
during relatively high inflationary periods due to the deferral
benefit of the tax code, that rationale possesses particular force
under current economic conditions."3
Some proponents of inflation indexing have enthusiastical-
ly supported Senate Bill 1635 by arguing that the current state
of low inflation may change. They argue that, now, when the
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 489.
12 See id.
13 See id.
131 See id.
1 See id.
" See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that in a period of low
inflation, the investor is compensated by deferral far more quickly then in periods
of high inflation).
" See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 235.
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Treasury will lose less money, is a politically opportune time to
push through this measure.'35 Notwithstanding any political
machinations, however, the bill must stand or fall on its merit.
The fact remains that if (and arguably so) the tax code was not
terribly unfair to capital investors during periods of high infla-
tion, then it is not unfair now.
Furthermore, many economists, including Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, have suggested that there is a real
possibility of deflation in the future.3 ' The proposed bill for
indexing capital gains, Senate Bill 1635, does not lower the
basis in the case of deflation.3 7 Therefore, an imbalance ex-
ists since an investor's basis is raised to its "real" value during
inflationary periods, but it is not counterbalanced with a down-
grade during deflationary periods. Presumably, the bill's draft-
ers are not bothered by this inconsistency because their goal is
to simply lower capital gains tax.'38 Concededly, to tax tax-
payers with nominal losses or no gains for the "real" profits
they earn is not politically viable. Doing so would amount to a
property tax on cash or personal property and would be very
unpopular. However, that difficulty alone does not justify in-
dexing the basis for investors only when it helps them. Accord-
ingly, the prospect of deflation militates against an inflation-
only basis adjustment.
2. Inflation and Accuracy
The CPI was adjusted recently to comport with economic
changes.'39 The adjustments to the CPI were both far-reach-
ing and controversial. In December 1996, a panel of econo-
mists testified before Congress that the old CPI was overstat-
i" See Norman G. Fosback, Stop Taxing Phantom Capital Gains, MUTUAL FUND
MAG., Sept. 1998, at 3.
1 See Greenspan Indicates FOMC Adopted Neutral Stance at Aug. 18 Meeting,
WORLD REP., Sept. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 15895368.
137 See supra note 3.
1 Senate Bill 1635 is entitled "A bill to reduce the maximum capital gains
rates." S. 1635, 105th Cong. (1998).
1 See It Overstates Inflation! Does Not! Does So!, BUS. WK., June 9, 1997, at
68 [hereinafter Inflation]; Jacob M. Schlesinger, U.S. Unveils Experimental Formu-
la For Calculating Consumer Price Index, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1997, at 2.
14 See Schlesinger, supra note 139, at 2.
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ing inflation by 1.1%." Other economists met the panel's
recommendations for change with strong opposition."" The
difficulty in measuring the CPI is attributable to the difficulty
in assessing quality improvements and incorporating them into
price increases accurately."4 When prices increase, because
of quality improvements, it is very difficult to assess if the con-
sumer is getting less for the dollar or is paying more because
the products are correspondingly superior. Quality improve-
ments have been occurring more frequently and rapidly of late,
thus exacerbating the difficulty of accurately measuring infla-
tion.' This development strengthens the NYSBA's argu-
ment " 5 that it is really impossible to accurately measure in-
flation. If the very yardstick measuring inflation is contro-
versial, the measure it produces cannot be considered
perfectly accurate.
Furthermore, inflation is not something that occurs across
the board in all industries. Thanks to technology, information
costs have often gone down in recent years, even though other
sectors have experienced inflation. 46 Different taxpayers and
businesses have different spending needs. One business, say a
media company, may need to spend a higher amount of its
budget on information costs than another. In the past few
years, while medical and food costs rose relatively sharply,
communication, transportation, and electrical costs have con-
sistently had much lower inflation.'47
Therefore, one whose livelihood and expenses are more
dependent on communications may have actually increased her
purchasing power. This is in contradistinction to an elderly
citizen, who likely had greater expenses for medical care,
whose purchasing power likely decreased at a higher rate than
the CPI. Therefore, the overall inflation rate does not accurate-
ly reflect the "real" spending power of individual taxpayers.
1 See Inflation, supra note 139.
1 See Inflation, supra note 139.
1 See Inflation, supra note 139.
14 See Inflation, supra note 139.
141 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
' See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 489.
147 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 489. Likewise, a similar vari-
ance exists among consumers in different regions. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, su-
pra note 56, at 494.
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Rather, as explained earlier, it is an aggregate estimate.48
It follows that using the inflation index would result in some
investors having their basis indexed to an inordinately high
increase. This result is not equitable. In addition, this wrin-
kle, combined with the controversy surrounding the CPI,
further calls into question any reliance upon the CPI or
similar indexes.
In sum, the current economy's low or disappearing infla-
tion strongly militates against inflation indexing. Furthermore,
deflation, which is a likely prospect, renders this measure both
moot and inequitable. Finally, the accuracy of measuring infla-
tion using an index such as the CPI has become more dubious,
undercutting any notions that inflation indexing will yield
accurate results.
B. Mutual Funds
More than ever before, Americans have spent the last
decade giddily pouring money into mutual funds. In fact,
by early 1996, United States investors had invested more in
mutual funds than they had placed in savings accounts in
banks. 5 ° Since 1996, United States investors have steadily
increased the flow of new money into mutual funds."
14 See supra note 109 (noting that the accuracy of the CPI is dependent on
less variance or deviation from the mean). It follows that the increased variance
created by technology and the consumers of said goods adversely affects the CPI's
accuracy.
... In 1980, there were 564 mutual funds with assets of $135 billion. In 1996,
there were 6,293 mutual funds containing more than $4.5 trillion of assets. See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 533. In addition, in 1980, the total nomi-
nal value of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $1.24 trillion. See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 532. Equity mutual funds held only $44
billion in assets. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 533. In 1996, while
the total value of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange increased ap-
proximately 600% to $7.3 trillion, the assets in equity mutual funds increased
approximately 4,000% to $1.75 trillion. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56,
at 532-33.
150 See generally WALTER UPDEGRAVE, MONEY@ THE RIGHT WAY TO INVEST IN
MUTUAL FUNDS (1996).
. See Bob Davis et al., Sharing the Wealth, More Social Security or Less?
Clinton Plan Faces Lots of Questions, WALL ST. J., Jan 20, 1999, at Al (noting
that since 1991, investors have averaged $11.5 billion of new money in the stock
market through mutual funds, and since 1996, they have averaged $17.1 billion a
month).
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A mutual fund is a pool of investment capital that is man-
aged by the fund's manager.'52 The manager typically in-
forms the investor in a prospectus of the nature of the fund's
general investment strategy.'53 The investment strategy pro-
vides information to the investor about what proportion of the
funds assets will be invested in which markets."5 This allows
an investor to determine the compatability of his own financial
goals and risk tolerance with that of an individual fund."'55
The prospectus also provides the investor with information
concerning past performance of the fund,'56 expenses for the
investor,5 ' and some tax information.'58 The fund manager
is paid out of the assets of the fund by some predetermined
expense ratio formula.'59 There is an ever-growing diversity
in the nature of funds accompanying an astonishing growth in
the total number of mutual funds. 6°
The advantages to the mutual fund investor are numer-
ous. 16' First, an unskilled investor receives the opportunity to
have his or her money professionally managed and invested for
a relatively low fee. 61 Second, mutual funds by definition in-
vest in more than one stock at a time, providing a level of
diversification of the investor's portfolio, which for the small
investor would otherwise be unachievable. 6  This is accom-
plished by the pooling of many investors' resources to create a
large enough pool of capital to afford diversification without
152 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (6th ed. 1990).
153 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 59.
15 See id.
11 See id; ROBERT GARDINER, THE DEAN WITIER GUIDE TO PERSONAL INVESTING
105 (rev. ed. 1997).
116 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 59.
t See id.
11 See id.
119 See id. at 137.
160 See id. at 2.
..1 See GARDINER, supra note 155, at 81; UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 19-37.
These elementary concepts are lauded in the literature of most mutual fund com-
panies. See, e.g., FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, THE FIDELTY CATALOG (1998). But see
generally JOHN L. SPRINGER, THE MUTUAL FUND TRAP (1973) (describing a less
flattering view of the mutual fund industry as one which takes advantage of unso-
phisticated investors by charging high premiums without a correspondingly ade-
quate return on investment).
1 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 23-24.
163 See id. at 28.
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transaction costs eating away too much of the profit.' Third,
mutual funds are very liquid, and in most cases, the investor
can cash out at any time.' Fourth, mutual funds are easy to
monitor.'66 Finally, the ordinary investor, who simply does
not have the money or time to otherwise invest can still partic-
ipate in what has become a national pastime-watching one's
portfolio increase in value.
Mutual funds have intrinsic advantages over retail inves-
tors as well. Due to large amounts of capital, fund managers
can spend more on researching companies than retail investors
can."'67 In addition, institutional investors, because of the
large capital they command, are often favored customers of un-
derwriters in large securities offerings.'68 Furthermore, the
SEC has recognized that mutual funds, due to the sophistica-
tion of fund managers and the leverage funds have as a result
of their large capital, need less regulatory protection from
issuers than do retail investors. As a result, Rule 144A of the
Securities Act of 1933 allows issuers, in certain limited circum-
stances, to issue securities that will be traded only among
qualified institutional buyers without having to fully register
the securities.' As a consequence of avoiding the cost of full
securities registration, issuers can raise capital via mutual
funds or similar institutions more cheaply than they can on
the public market. This additional market for mutual funds is
another advantage that funds have over retail investors.
The evolution of the mutual fund industry has recently
spawned an increasingly popular product, the index fund. Un-
like actively managed funds, an index fund does not try to pick
the best stocks.70 Rather, the goal of an index fund is to
mimic the performance of a major index such as the S & P
500' or the Russel 2,000.172 Index funds advertise that
1 See id.
166 See id. at 30.
'6 See id. at 31.
17 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 23-24.
1 See Randall Smith & Suzanne McGee, Major Institutions, Led by Fidelity,
Get Most of Hot IPOs, Lists Show, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2000, at C1.
169 Rule 144A basically provides that securities that are not traded on an ex-
change can be sold to qualified institutional buyers (specified entities, including
mutual funds, that own and invest on a discretionary basis at least $100 million)
without registration. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1999).
170 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 189.
m" Standard and Poors 500 is an index that measures the stock performance of
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they provide adequate investment performance at low cost,
which results in superior total returns for investors.
The theory behind index funds is that since the fund will
mimic a cross section of the market, the investor will still
profit from the general market performance. In addition, the
manager, who must merely mimic an index, need not spend a
lot of money on research and can be paid less than the coun-
terpart in an actively managed fund. Furthermore, an index
fund will ordinarily have a lower turnover rate. Hence, the ex-
pense ratio will ordinarily be lower in an index fund than in
an actively managed fund. Index fund enthusiasts argue that
the investor will have superior total earnings.
The performance of index funds has been promising in
recent years. 4 This is particularly true in index funds that
mimic the indexes which track large companies.17 In general,
such index funds have outperformed the majority of actively
managed funds. 6 Commentators have explained this phe-
nomenon that mutual funds overwhelmingly dominate the
market for large companies' securities.' Hence, mathemati-
cally, only one half of mutual funds are able to outperform an
index. Since the index fund carries a lower expense ratio for
investors, it follows that its total performance will be better
than the performance of most of the actively managed funds.
However, in other investment sectors actively managed funds
have generally outperformed index funds.'
The tax regime of the mutual fund creates a tax liability
similar to the one the investor would incur from direct invest-
ment. As a "regulated investment company" mutual funds
qualify to be taxed as flow-through entities to their investors,
thereby avoiding layers of taxation.' Basically, to qualify, a
500 large U.S. corporations. See id. at 259.
1 The Russel 2,000 is an index that measures the performance of 2,000 small
U.S. corporations. See id. at 258.
173 See id. at 194.
l See id.
171 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 194.
17 See id.
177 See id. at 193.
178 See id. at 194-95.
17 See Randall C. McGeorge & Lorna A. McGeorge, Tax Aspects of Mutual
Funds, 70 FLA. B.J. 66 (1996) (providing practical information on mutual fund
taxation). "Regulated Investment Companies" are covered in 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-855,
[Vol. 65:3
1NDEXING CAPITAL GAINS FOR IVFLATION
mutual fund must distribute 90% of its income to its share-
holders as dividends. 8 ° The income includes whatever the
fund earns from interest, dividends, or the sale of capital
gains. As a practical matter, funds ordinarily distribute 98%
of their gains at the end of the year when the gains are most
easily calculated.'8' Accordingly, the mutual fund investor
will pay the taxes on whatever capital gains are realized by
the fund. The tax liability is analogous, with some important
exceptions,'82 to the tax liability incurred by a private indi-
vidual investor.
1. Mutual Funds and the Lock In Argument
The growth of mutual funds impacts on the lock in argu-
ment for the indexing of capital gains for inflation. Arguably,
the current unindexed capital gains tax is an influential
externality on investment decision-making. Therefore, the
ordinary investor under the current system of taxation is com-
pelled to lock in investments in order to take advantage of
deferral benefits that help offset the onerous burden of
unindexed capital gains taxes."8 This lock in causes money
to be inefficiently invested thus creating a drag in the econo-
my. ' If popular investment vehicles, by their nature, did not
allow for lock in, and such investment vehicles occupy a large
proportion of the nation's investment capital, the capital gains
tax would be a less influential externality on national invest-
ment decisions and national capital allocation. Hence, the lock
in argument is much less persuasive.
The mutual fund manager, for a number of reasons, can-
not simply lock in investors' funds for long periods of time."
860.
" See McGeorge & McGeorge, supra note 179.
18. See McGeorge & McGeorge, supra note 179, at 66 n.1.
1 See infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
18 This perception of the tax oblivious mutual fund manager has also been ar-
ticulated in the media. See Daniel Goldstein, VA Marketers 'Cheery' Despite Tax
Woes, 6 BANK MUTUAL FUND REP. No. 8, Feb. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL
5109940 ("[Blecause mutual fund managers focus on total returns rather than tax
efficiency, they don't hold individual stocks long enough to take advantage of...
lower capital gains rate. 'They're going to sell the stock whenever it reaches its
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Accordingly, mutual funds are investment vehicles with an
immunity from the lock in effect. It follows that growth in
mutual fund investing minimizes the influence that the capital
gains tax externality has on national capital allocation. Hence,
growth in mutual fund investing weakens any putative lock in
effect on the economy.
There are several natural factors that prevent managers of
actively managed funds from locking in investments. The first
is purely economic. Investors in an actively managed fund
ordinarily pay a premium over the share value of mutual funds
that they invest in." This premium is usually paid as part of
the expense ratio to pay for the management expenses of the
fund.'87 The premium is critical to the fund manager since,
aside from any personal investments the manager may have in
the fund, the premium that the fund charges to investors pays
the manager's salary.
From the perspective of the investor, the premium she
pays is not for the quality of the fund's present holdings. The
investor could more cheaply duplicate any portfolio by examin-
ing the published stock holdings of a mutual fund,"'88 and as-
signing to a broker the task of acquiring the identical portfo-
lio."'89 Rather, the investor is paying a premium because the
investor believes that the future stock trades of the manager
will likely be significantly superior than the investor's individ-
ual stock trades will be. The investor hopes that the fund will
realize enough gains that will make the premium the investor
paid worthwhile.
Courts have long recognized this reality that any premium
paid to a mutual fund reflects only the investor's perceptions
or hopes of the fund's future performance. Gerdes v.
Reynolds"9 concerned the sale by a controlling group of
shareholders of the controlling shares of the Reynolds Invest-
ment Company.'9' The purchasers offered to the controlling
shareholders a high premium for the shares, which the control
break point." (quoting Mark Mackey, NAVA president)).
188 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 2.
187 See id.
18 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
188 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
190 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. Special T. New York County 1941).
191 See id. at 622.
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group happily accepted.'92 Upon obtaining control, the pur-
chasers proceeded to loot the company of its assets.'93 The
minority shareholders sued the original control group for
breaching their duty of care.' 94 The plaintiffs claimed that
the premium offered for the shares should have put the control
group on notice that the prospective buyers intended to loot
the company.' 95
The court in Gerdes found that because the company in-
volved was a mutual fund, the directors could be charged with
constructive notice of the purchasers' intent to commit
fraud. 96 Hence the court found that they had breached the
duty of care to the minority shareholders and were liable for
damages. 97 The court in its holding described why paying a
premium for purchasing control of a mutual fund company is
almost impossible to justify.
Not even the sagacity and acumen displayed in selecting and assem-
bling its portfolio was an element of value, because its portfolio was
publicly disclosed in published statistics, 9 ' and any admirer of the
genius for security selection displayed by the company's managers
could appropriate that genius for himself by examining printed vol-
umes of security manuals which any broker expecting an order
would have been only too glad to make available free of charge."i
Therefore, the court concluded that the control group should
have had notice that the buyers were planning deceit."'0
Of course, not every investor who pays a premium for
mutual fund stock has evil designs. Rather, as explained earli-
er, the investor is paying for the future sagacity of the fund,
which as a factual matter, the investor cannot duplicate. This
is in contradistinction to Gerdes, where the purchasers bought
the control of the fund, and changed its management, 01 and
192 See id.
193 See id.
1% See id.
19 See Gerdes, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
19 See id.
'97 See id. at 658.
199 At the time this case was litigated, such disclosure was voluntary, but oc-
curred in the particular case. See id. at 657. The Investment Company Act of
1940 has since made such disclosure mandatory in the case of all mutual funds.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1999); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30.d.1 (1999).
199 Gerdes, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
200 See id. at 658.
201 See id. at 629.
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had no interest in the future trades of the managers of the
fund. The court found that absent the payment of a premium
for future stock selection, there is no economic justification for
paying a premium for mutual fund shares.
It follows that the fund manager is marketing future
trades and not present holdings when he or she sells shares of
the fund. Accordingly, to remain marketable a fund manager
cannot simply hold stock positions or lock in investments.
Investor perception of such inactivity would result in investors,
particularly new ones, having little incentive to cover the cost
of management. They would more likely attempt to follow the
recommendation of the Gerdes court and simply mimic a fund's
holdings."2 Indeed, an index fund, which generally has a
much lower turnover than an actively managed fund and hence
has a greater proportion of its value in its present holdings
than an actively managed fund, does, in fact, generally charge
lower fees. Thus, fund managers, if they wish to justify their
expense ratios, are compelled to trade actively and not to lock
in investments. The fund manager has a burden to attempt to
consistently outperform any benefit provided by locking in
investments. Therefore, rather than being induced to lock
investments in inferior investments for tax purposes the man-
ager is compelled to constantly seek out the best investments.
A second reason why fund managers are not likely to hold
positions for the sake of tax benefits is practicality. It would be
nearly impossible for a fund manager to account for all the
shareholders' tax consequences, because not all mutual fund
investors in a single fund are alike. In 1996 pension funds
owned over $400 billion of mutual funds."' These accounts
are normally tax advantaged. °4 Additionally, state and local
governments held $37 billion.0 ' Furthermore, many investors
may be non-profit organizations. Investors commonly have pri-
vate IRAs invested in mutual funds. Also, tax-brackets may
differ among investors. For these reasons a manager may find
that it is nearly impossible to factor in tax ramifications for all
of the shareholders because of the diversity of the inves-
205 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
203 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 56, at 529.
204 The Internal Revenue Code provides favorable tax treatment for qualified
pension plans. See 26 I.R.C. §§ 401-404, 410-416 (1999).
20 See id.
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tors." 6 Tax conscious considerations appropriate for certain
shareholders of the fund may be hyperconscious for other
shareholders, leading to ultimately inferior returns. Hence,
many funds operate as though taxes do not exist and allow the
shareholders to deal with their taxes individually.
In addition, it is very hard to market a fund as tax con-
scious, since studies show that it is almost impossible to pre-
dict a fund's future tax performance.0 7 Some commentators
have deemed futile the search for the tax efficient mutual
fund.20 8 Traditionally, funds with a lower turnover rate were
considered more tax efficient since they would have fewer
distributions.0 9 Recently however, a consensus has emerged
that turnover rate is often misleading. This is caused by an
interesting quirk created by the flow-through taxation of mutu-
al funds. The tax code measures the term of an investment and
its profits by when the fund bought the stocks, not by when
the shareholder bought into the fund.210
The tax code's approach, in reality, is to assign the tax
liability of the fund to those shareholders who own shares of
the fund at the time the fund realizes its gains. Hence, it
charges shareholders a tax on the distributions of the fund,
regardless if those shareholders were already shareholders
when the fund purchased the shares or accrued its gains, and
whether or not those shareholders ever actually earned a prof-
it. 21" ' If a fund purchased a stock in 1990 for $50 a share and
in 1997 it was worth $200, and the fund then sold in 1998 for
$180, it makes a distribution to its shareholders who own
shares at the time it declares its dividend,212 regardless of
20 See Julie Creswell, Mutual Fund's Stress on Taxes Shows Growth, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 19, 1998, at A9 (noting that industry observers comment that tax con-
sciousness by mutual fund managers would create a dichotomy, since some
shareholders' tax considerations are different than other shareholders).
2" See Maria Atanosov, Tilting at Tax Efficiency, FORTUNE MAG., Feb. 2, 1998,
at 170.
20 See id. (describing the search for a profitable and tax efficient fund as one
for the holy grail). To be sure, some companies have tried to market tax efficient
products. See Lowering the Tax Bill on Stocks, GLOBAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 25
(Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Spring 1998). However, there has not been a market
rush.
206 See McGeorge & McGeorge, supra note 179.
210 See McGeorge & McGeorge, supra note 179.
21 See Anna Kates Smith, Your Fund May Pack A Surprise, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 1998, at 75.
2"2 This usually occurs within a few months of when the shares were sold and
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when they bought shares of the fund. Accordingly, an investor
who bought when the stock was worth $200, not only will take
a loss, but the investor will have to pay taxes.213
Accordingly, many funds which have had historically low
turnover and high tax efficiency may in fact have been build-
ing up a ticking tax bomb, which will explode when they make
their distributions. When the inevitable distributions take
place, the investors will have the tax liability of all those accu-
mulated profits from the years that the fund made no or small
distributions and deferred its tax liability. A new investor, who
thinks that a fund is tax proficient based on past performance,
will receive a rude awakening. The investor can be hit not
only with tax liability for the period of the investment but also
with tax liability stemming from the time the fund earned its
reputation as tax proficient. Conversely, a fund with a low
tax rating may, though not necessarily, ultimately carry no
tax liability, and therefore may be more tax efficient for a
new investor.
Furthermore, turnover ratio measures the number of
transactions regardless if the same 10% of the fund was traded
ten times. 4 If the same portion of assets is turned over
many times in one year, the distributions do not increase, since
they are tallied at the end of the year.2 5 Accordingly, one
must occur prior to the next January 1. See McGeorge & McGeorge, supra note
179, at 66.
" See Smith, supra note 211, at 75. This unfortunate phenomenon occurred
with increased frequency in 1998, as many funds which held stock for long periods
of time during the bull market of the 1990s had to sell during the market decline
of the summer of 1998 to retain profits. See id. At the same time, many investors
bought shares in those funds when the market was at its high and became liable
for the tax distributions that occurred while they lost money. See id. This certain-
ly violates horizontal equity. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. However,
reform of the mutual fund tax regime is beyond the scope of this Note. Some
suggestions will likely include greater disclosure by mutual funds of the possibility
of paying taxes even when the investor loses money, or alternatively, protection
for shareholders in the form of a right to defer some of the income from distribu-
tions that occur when the share value is lower than the purchase price until the
shareholder redeems the shares.
24 See Harold Evensky, Turnover, Tax Efficiency, and the Big Myth, FIN. PLAN.,
Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10306390.
215 See id.
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turnover of 30% of the funds assets results in greater tax lia-
bility than ten turnovers of 10%. Therefore, the turnover rate
is not a reliable predictor of tax efficiency.21
For these reasons, actively managed funds cannot market
themselves in the long term as tax conscious. An area a fund
can market itself in, however, is the total pre-tax return. To
achieve that, fund managers cannot be overly tax conscious.
Therefore, mutual fund managers are compelled to constantly
seek out the best investments, regardless of tax consequences,
and are not susceptible to tax consideration inducing phenome-
na such as lock in.
In addition, index funds are completely immune from lock
in. A successful index fund is one that successfully mimics its
index.217 Indeed, this is the goal that the index fund contracts
with its investors to accomplish. Hence, since its goal is to
ensure that its portfolio maintains a similarity with the portfo-
lio of a major index, tax considerations should play no role in
the decision-making process. Performance is not measured by
return but rather on the success of the fund's achieving a re-
semblance to its index. Accordingly, the capital gains tax
externality has no influence on both actively managed funds
and index funds.
In addition, because of the flow-through regime of mutual
fund taxation, individual investors are forced to realize a per-
centage of their gains. They cannot simply accrue gains and
avoid tax liability. Hence, they are less susceptible to the sec-
ond form of lock in, of reducing the utility of their assets in the
hope of avoiding tax liability.
Therefore, if mutual funds continue to grow as a percent-
age of the capital investments market, more investment capital
will be immune from lock in. The capital gains externality and
its associated economic inefficiency of lock in will be accord-
ingly diminished, and the utility of capital gains will not be so
reduced from lock in. Hence, the need to index the code to
avoid lock in and its economic effects is also diminished.
216 See id.
21 See UPDEGRAVE, supra note 150, at 254.
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2. Mutual Funds and Simplicity
Commentators have pointed out that the greatest complex-
ities likely to arise from inflation indexing of capital gains will
be in the area of mutual funds.218 Mutual fund investors of-
ten invest in a fund under a plan that allows the fund to auto-
matically reinvest their distributions. It follows that mutual
fund investors who realize capital gains by selling shares in a
fund will have to calculate a separate inflation adjustment for
every period of investment. An investor with an automatic
investment plan will be required to make as many as fifty
different inflation adjustments.219 The enormous complexities
and costs that could arise from this may well make mutual
funds a far less attractive method of investing. This effectively
undercuts any argument that the government should index
capital gains to promote mutual fund investing.
In addition, the additional costs from the loss of simplicity
may indeed outweigh any putative benefit of inflation indexing.
In fact, it may well be that those countries who successfully
implemented capital gains inflation adjustments" ° have far
fewer mutual fund investors than the United States has today.
Rather, their national investment portfolio is likely comprised
of less complex investment vehicles such as common stock and
similar simple investments, which are not susceptible to the
same complexities as mutual funds. Hence, it is not reliable to
use those countries as a model for the United States to follow.
Accordingly, the dynamic growth of mutual funds strengthens
the argument that inflation indexing will create significant
value complexity.
3. Mutual Funds and Equity
Mutual funds benefit the economy as a whole by providing
an efficient intermediary household sector capital to reach the
business sector. They are efficient intermediaries because they
have economies of scale, and they thus reduce information
costs by requiring only the manager to find out information.
215 See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 237.
219 See id.
22 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65: 3
1=DEXING CAPITAL GAINS FOR INFLATION
Furthermore, since fund managers presumptively have a supe-
rior ability to process and act upon market information, and
because they are immune to externalities such as lock in,"
they increase national allocative efficiency.' Finally, they
open the door of portfolio investing to many private investors
who would otherwise be unable to invest by giving" them the
opportunity to invest without the transaction costs of individu-
al trades eating away at their profit. It follows that the tax
code should therefore encourage mutual fund investing by
taxing their investments equitably.
Currently, the tax code is unkind to mutual fund investors
because fund managers ignore tax ramifications, thus causing
mutual fund investors to actually pay the inflationary tax
without the full benefit of deferral." Hence, mutual fund in-
vestors are likely to have a higher average effective tax burden
than ordinary capital gains investors who benefit fully from
deferral. In addition, the flow-through taxation regime of mu-
tual funds, which in some cases creates tax liability for inves-
tors who suffered an actual loss, violates horizontal equity. In
fact, individual fund investors who receive the same return
from different funds will more likely than not have different
tax liabilities, violating critical equity norms.
However, the tax inequities created from distribution tim-
ing are only tangentially related to inflation indexing. Inflation
indexing would not remedy the lack of vertical equity among
fund investors and therefore solutions to these problems are
outside the ambit of this Note. In addition, notwithstanding
that fund investors receive harsh and arbitrary tax treatment,
mutual fund investors apparently believe they have done very
See supra notes 186-217 and accompanying text.
= See supra note 86. It may well be that the unusual combination of low infla-
tion coupled with economic growth of the last decade is a result of an increase in
allocative efficiency. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Under a Keynesian
model, an inability of the business sector to attain necessary funds from the
household sector, either because of insufficient savings or over consumption, causes
a cash shortage and corresponding increases in interest rates followed by inflation.
It should follow that allocative efficiency allows the household sector to save less,
consume more and yet still sufficiently support the business sector to prevent
inflation. This increased allocative efficiency, if it in fact exists, may be a result of
more sophisticated investors or the increased use of investment vehicles such as
mutual funds. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
22 See supra note 185.
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well, evidenced by the ever increasing flow of money in to
funds.2 Apparently, then, many investors believe that the
fund manager can actually outpace what they would gain
through individual investing and deferral.2" For now, the
growth of mutual fund investing does not appear to be imped-
ed by the tax code.
The growth of mutual fund investing is a phenomenon
that reduces the lock in effect, an inefficiency which the cur-
rent tax code arguably exacerbates. The minimization of lock
in was "the most serious argument in favor of a capital gains
preference."226 It also strengthens the argument that inflation
indexing will lead to complexity and costs that will outweigh
any benefit derived from inflation indexing 2  It is true that
the mutual fund tax regime creates gross inequities, but infla-
tion indexing would not fully correct the problems unique to
mutual fund taxation. Therefore, on the whole, the emergence
of mutual funds, with its attendant benefits, argues strongly
against indexing the code.
C. Information Technology
An argument against the indexing of the code has always
been that the code should be simplified. The rationale for a
simplified code is that any money spent in trying to under-
stand the code is essentially an information and agency cost
and should be minimized accordingly. A simple code forces
fewer taxpayers to pay for tax preparation, and the
accountants' work is simpler and their fees cheaper. For the
taxpayer, the fees paid for tax preparation are additional tax-
es; the only difference being that they are paid to an accoun-
tant rather than to the government. Hence, it is desirable to
have a simple code.
With the emergence of user-friendly computer tax pro-
grams, this argument loses considerable merit. Accountants no
longer spend their tax season carefully making long calcula-
tions on their ledgers. Instead, accountants are increasingly
"' See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
It is possible that this is merely due to the combination of a booming stock
market and low inflation, factors which may both well disappear in the future.
Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 25, at 344.
See Shuldiner, Not Capital Gains, supra note 11, at 237.
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relying on tax programs228 for which the cost of a standard
return in a simple system is not much different then the cost
for a standard return in a complicated system. While estate
planning may still require more costs, this too will likely
change with increased information technology.
In 1997, Congress issued significant changes in the tax
code."2 The day after the tax change was passed, T. Rowe
Price, a large investment company, began the distribution of
computer software designed to explain the effect of the new
changes." The price of this software was a relatively insig-
nificant $9.95.Y1 The ability of companies to disseminate
more information to more taxpayers cheaply is a result of in-
formation technology. Products similar to the software that T.
Rowe Price marketed are likely to minimize the information
costs that indexing for inflation would cause.
Information technology complexities equalizes the cost of
preparing standard returns in complicated codes to its cost in
simple codes. Therefore, with the increase in information tech-
nology, the argument that indexing inflation will increase
information costs is weakened.
However, as explained earlier, among the arguments
against inflation indexing, the cost to the economy from com-
plications was the least persuasive.2 Rather, the stronger
arguments against inflation indexing are that there is no wide-
spread unfairness to capital gains taxpayers, that no inflation
adjustment is perfectly accurate anyway, and that there is no
economic loss due to the failure to index for inflation. Hence,
opponents of indexing conclude that there is no reason to make
such a dramatic overhaul of the tax system with all its accom-
panying practical difficulties of implementation and revenue
replacement.
' Such programs include Turbo Tax and TaxCut. For a review of these prod-
ucts, see Jim Frederick, Filing on Your Computer, With the Right Software You
Can do Your Return Yourself, MONEY MAG., Jan. 1, 1999, at 132.
22 The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 included varying rates for long term and
short term gains, residential exemptions, and tax credits for education. See Pub. L.
No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (Aug. 5, 1997).
' See T. Rowe Automates 401 (k) Choices, 5 BANK MUTUAL FUND REP. No. 42,
Nov. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14237153.
' See id.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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An additional impact of technology is the increased ability
of private investors to get sophisticated investment information
cheaply. This is largely a product of the world wide web and
similar electronic media. The impact of such media on invest-
ment behavior at the time of this note is speculative. It is
possible that future individual investors may have sufficient
access to sophisticated information to invest proficiently by
themselves and have little need to pay mutual fund manage-
ment fees. Accordingly, large institutions would no longer dom-
inate the investment landscape. In such a world, allocative
efficiency may be even greater than it is in today's world of
institutional investors. However, in that world of individual
retail investors, lock in would potentially be an externality
that would justify tax preferences for capital gains. An alter-
native possibility is that investors simply will not wish to
spend their leisure time tracking their portfolios and the world
wide web will have a minimal impact on institutions. As all of
this is speculative, any conclusions are currently inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, because of low inflation, the equity
arguments against inflation indexing have been strengthened,
since investors can now more easily compensate for inflation
via deferral. The uneven distribution of inflation over the econ-
omy, caused by technological advances, also strengthens the
argument that inflation indexing is not an entirely accurate
remedy. Likewise, the recent controversy over the CPI makes
the argument that inflation indexing is not accurate more
compelling. Thus, considering its lack of accuracy, inflation
indexing may, in fact, be inappropriate.
In addition, the mutual fund revolution has undermined
the lock in argument, that the unindexed code creates an inef-
ficient allocation of the nation's economic resources. As ex-
plained earlier, mutual funds are largely immune from lock in,
hence the astonishing growth of funds would likely minimize
any putative effect that lock in may have on the economy. In
addition, mutual funds weaken any indexing argument based
on utility lock in. 33 As the merit of these arguments has in-
' See supra Part II.B.1.
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creased substantially over the past few years, it follows that
the current economic trends militate against inflation indexing,
both from an equity and an efficiency point of view.
Of course, all of these trends are not static. An increase in
inflation coupled with higher interest rates and a depressed
stock market reducing the mutual fund industry is a plausible
future reality. Such a scenario would alter the conclusions of
this Note. In addition, of the factors considered, information
technology is the most likely to only continue to grow in im-
pact. Hence, while this Note concludes that today is not a cor-
rect time for inflation indexing, inflation indexing may yet be a
proper tax measure sometime in the future.
In conclusion, indexing inflation is not a new issue and the
battle lines are as much political as they are economic. Howev-
er, the failure of the government to pass this measure in the
past is an indicator that the national will has seen inflation
indexing as inappropriate. Given the nation's present economic
conditions, this conclusion remains particularly strong.
Shimon B. Edelstein
1999]

